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ABSTRACT 
As the international development finance architecture decentralises, a plethora of regional multilateral 
development banks (MDBs) emerge. The institutional landscape in Asia is transforming with the establishment of 
the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). This working paper aims to shed light on the horizontal 
relationship between the traditional development actor, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the nascent 
AIIB. Based on the collaborative experiences of the European Investment Bank (EIB) and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), this paper recommends that ADB and the AIIB should form a tri-partite 
coordination mechanism to promote cooperation and equality, develop complementary portfolios in terms of 
sectoral exposure and geographical coverage, and co-fund projects to catalyse greater inter-agency cooperation. 
The resulting synergies will stitch the two institutions into an interdependent and coherent development finance 
structure in Asia and beyond.      
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Promoting Regional Development Bank 
Complementarity: Challenges to Asia and Lessons 
from Europe 
JI XIANBAI1 
1. Introduction 
The centralised global economic architecture built 
on the foundation of the key Bretton Woods 
institutions is undergoing structural shifts with the 
emergence of new regional and non-traditional 
institutions (Rana, 2014). In the field of 
international development financing, the 
decentralisation process manifests itself partly in 
the successive founding of regional multilateral 
development banks (MDBs), which are formed by a 
group of countries to stimulate economic and 
social progress in developing countries by 
mobilising international finance and 
developmental knowledge. For the past decades, 
the World Bank Group has played the leading role 
in fighting poverty and raising standard of living 
worldwide, but it is also becoming overly rigid, 
aloof, bureaucratic and dominated by the interests 
of developed, non-borrowing shareholding 
countries (Wihtol, 2014). Regional development 
banks in which developing countries are both 
clients and shareholders are trumpeted to be 
responsive, flexible, innovative and apolitical 
(Griffith-Jones, Griffith-Jones, & Hertova, 2008).  
While regional institutions indeed have brought 
relief to some of the pressing concerns that afflict 
countries in need of foreign development 
assistance, they also pose new challenges to the 
already complex ecosystem of development 
finance. For one, development solutions prescribed 
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by regional banks should strive to be coherent 
globally to spur positive spill-overs. For another, 
MDBs should not undercut each other by triggering 
off unhealthy competition. These two challenges 
are intimately intertwined – MDBs cannot serve as 
building blocks of an efficient global system unless 
there are sufficient synergies among themselves, 
and vice versa. Given the anarchic environment in 
which international bureaucracies act (Grieco, 
1988) and MDB’s tendency to expand mandates 
over time – a feature known as “mission creep” 
(Prada, 2014), coordination and cooperation 
between regional banks based on such principles 
as additionality, complementarity and comparative 
advantage should be consciously promoted.  
In this context, this policy brief examines the 
increasingly crowded development finance 
landscape in Asia, where traditional donors have 
been the World Bank and its regional spin-off, the 
Asian Development Bank (ADB). The issue of donor 
coordination, or lack thereof, surfaced with the 
advent of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
(AIIB). While much effect has been made to 
encourage vertical collaboration between the 
World Bank and ADB (see for example, Nehru, 
2014), this paper aims to shed light on the 
horizontal relationship between ADB and the AIIB 
and makes recommendations on how to promote 
coordination at the institutional level, cooperation 
at the portfolio level and co-optation at the project 
level. It argues that there are relevant lessons to be 
drawn by Asian institutions from their European 
counterparts. After all, for more than two decades, 
Europe was the only continent that is home to two 
leading regional MDBs – the Luxembourg-based 
European Investment Bank (EIB) and the London-
headquartered European Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development (EBRD).   
Based mainly on the four MDBs’ corporate 
publications, press releases, project databases, 
websites and other public available literature, this 
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paper is structured in the following manner. The 
second section provides an overview of the four 
MDBs concerned. Section 3 discusses how to 
smoothen inter-institutional coordination through 
tri-partite development partnership. Sections 4 and 
5 elaborate on the experiences in Europe, and 
prospect in Asia, of nurturing complementary loan 
portfolios in terms of sectoral distribution and 
geographical coverage, respectively. Section 6 
zooms in to the project level and explains how co-
financing could be a pragmatic first step towards a 
congenial inter-bank relationship in Asia. Section 7 
concludes.   
2. Overview of the four MDBs 
European Investment Bank 
The EIB is the world’s oldest regional MDB and the 
largest multilateral lending institution by volume. 
It was created in 1958 by the Treaty of Rome and 
now operates under a general mandate of 
supporting sound and sustainable investments 
within the European Union (EU) and beyond in the 
interest of the 28-nation bloc.   
Presiding over a vast capital base of €243 billion, 
the EIB Group, consisting of the EIB and the 
European Investment Fund (EIF) dedicated to 
small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), lent 
€84.5 billion and leveraged an additional €50 
billion in 2015. To put the figures in context, the 
World Bank’s capital base is $252.8 billion, and its 
loans in the fiscal year 2015 were $42.5 billion. As 
the “EU’s bank”, the EIB’s core business is to serve 
the EU’s internal objectives including balanced 
growth, economic integration and social cohesion. 
But around 10% of its annual investment (€7.8 
billion in 2015) is allocated to operations outside 
the EU to fulfil Brussels’ foreign policy priorities.  
To the extent that the EIB is a statutory body of the 
EU, its decision-making procedure follows the 
double majority principle instituted by the Lisbon 
Treaty. For a decision to be adopted at the EIB, a 
favourable vote of the majority of the board 
members and the majority of the subscribed 
capital are required. In certain policy areas, a 
qualified majority – eighteen votes and 68% of the 
capital – is mandatory. However, in practice 
consensus decision-making is the norm.  
European Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development 
The EBRD was founded in 1991 to be the first post-
Cold War multilateral institution. The historic 
mission of the EBRD was to assist former 
communist countries from Central and Eastern 
Europe and ex-Soviet Republics to transit from 
command economies to free-market economies. 
Over the past decades, the EBRD has earned a 
reputation for its expertise on decentralisation, de-
monopolisation, de-regulation, privatisation, 
legalisation and non-traditional development 
intervention in areas such as nuclear safety and 
de-commissioning (ADB, 2016b; Robinson & Bain, 
2011). It is owned by 65 countries, the European 
Commission, and the EIB. With an authorised 
capital pool of €30 billion, the EBRD’s financing 
totalled €9.4 billion in 2015.   
The EBRD differs from other regional banks in four 
crucial ways. First, the EBRD has an outright 
political mandate to promote multi-party 
democracy, political pluralism and rule of law. 
Second, the EBRD’s financial assistance is heavily 
skewed in favour of private sector clients and 
entrepreneurial initiatives, while the bulk of other 
MDBs’ assistance is directed towards sovereign 
loans and government-backed operations. Third, 
the EBRD adopts the business model of a 
commercial investment bank characterised by 
high-risk taking appetite, rather than that of a 
conventional aid-oriented, not-for-profit 
development bank. The EBRD raises funds on 
international capital markets and follows a market-
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based pricing policy, compared to the EIB’s risk-
based policy. Lastly, the EBRD’s ratio of paid-in 
capital is the highest among all major MDBs.  
Asian Development Bank 
The Manila-based ADB was established in 1966 
under the auspice of the United Nation’s Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East (Krishnamurti, 
1977). The plan to create an international financial 
institution (IFI) in East Asia was endorsed by the 
United States (US) and Japan, which subsequently 
became the bank’s largest shareholders and 
donors. ADB’s mission is to reduce poverty in the 
Asia Pacific through inclusive economic growth, 
environmentally sustainable growth and regional 
integration (ADB, 2008). It is owned by 67 
countries which contribute to its $153 billion 
equity pot. In 2015, ADB’s operations climbed to a 
historic high of $27.2 billion, including $16.6 billion 
financed by ADB’s own resources, $10.4 billion in 
co-financing and $144 million in technical 
assistance.  
ADB is in many ways a regional replica of the 
World Bank – it consciously modelled on the World 
Bank in terms of stated mission, governance and 
activities (Lesage, 2013; Mason & Asher, 2010). It is 
the only regional bank that shares the World 
Bank’s mandate to end extreme poverty, and has a 
similar weighted voting system to reflect 
members’ capital subscriptions. ADB operates with 
a soft lending window of Asian Development Fund 
(ADF) for its poorest and most debt-stricken and a 
hard window of ordinary capital resources (OCR), 
mirroring the World Bank Group’s separation of 
the concessional International Development 
Association and the non-concessional International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In 
addition, both the World Bank and ADB are 
pioneers among international organisations of 
using rating system to evaluate the impact of 
country programmes and investment projects 
(Sasaki, 2012).  
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank 
The AIIB is the youngest MDB, having officially 
opened its doors in 2016 for a specific purpose: to 
“foster sustainable economic development, create 
wealth and improve infrastructure connectivity in 
Asia by investing in infrastructure and other 
productive sectors”. Led by a veteran international 
finance technocrat Jin Liqun, the bank is 
headquartered in Beijing. The initial subscribed 
capital of $100 billion is contributed by 57 
founding members. 
Like the EBRD, the AIIB was launched at a historical 
turning point – the fall of the Berlin Wall for the 
former and the increasing confidence of China as it 
rises to become the second largest economy in the 
world – against the headwinds of American 
oppositions (Jakobeit, 1992; Tang, 2015). The US 
boycotted the establishment of the AIIB and gave 
the bank a wide berth after failing to convince 
others to turn down Beijing’s invitations. Following 
the lead of the United Kingdom, key US 
transatlantic and trans-Pacific allies, except Japan 
and Canada, had all flocked to sign on to the AIIB, 
ignoring repeated diktats from Washington.  
More significantly, the pace at which the AIIB 
gathers momentum indicates that China may have 
gained an upper hand in the competition against 
the US over how best to address the world’s 
development bottleneck in the 21st century. 
Spearheading two mega-regional free trade 
agreements– the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, 
the US prescription is to lower behind-the-border 
trade barriers through reciprocal free trade 
agreements. China, alternatively, believes in 
slashing logistics impediments and creating new 
trade routes through infrastructure development 
to prop up the low-flying world economy. As AIIB 
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President Jin had put it, establishing the AIIB is not 
about “the amount of assets we can build up,” but 
“the new approach we would like to try” (Jin, 
2015). The successful launch of the AIIB can be 
understood as a vote of confidence in China’s 
more broad-based agenda.  
A comparison of the four MDBs is summarised in 
Table 1.    
3. Tri-partite coordination 
In line with the legalistic European approach, 
European banks have a tradition of formalised 
cooperation. In March 2011, the EIB and the EBRD 
set out their latest framework for effective 
cooperation outside the EU to govern their 
relations. The rationale for opting for a tri-partite 
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) – as 
opposed to previous bi-partite ones – by inviting 
the participation of the European Commission (EC) 
is manifold.   
First, the triangular partnership with EC 
chairmanship introduces a hierarchical dimension 
into an otherwise horizontal relationship, thereby 
reinforcing equality between the EIB and the EBRD. 
The three parties created a Steering Committee 
with EC chairmanship to oversee “the overall 
coordination and supervision of institutional and 
operational cooperation, to share experience and 
to maximise synergies in policy support, financing, 
and grant funding”. The partnership also entrusted 
the EC to serve as an impartial arbiter should 
misunderstandings arise or aggressive 
competitions for EU resources occur. The 
interlocutor in Brussels is the Director for Finance 
and Coordination with EIB Group, EBRD and IFIs 
under the Directorate-General for Economic and 
Financial Affairs.   
Second, the EC, as the executive arm of the world’s 
largest development aid donor, the EU, can scale 
up the interventions of the EIB and the EBRD when 
needed. The European development “troika” have 
blended their resources in schemes such as the 
Western Balkan Investment Facility for pre-
accession countries, the Neighbourhood 
Investment Facility which channel aids to Southern 
and Eastern European countries, and the 
Investment Facility for Central Asia (European 
Commission, 2016). A related benefit is that the 
presence of the EC in the donor cooperation 
framework leads to a more optimal configuration 
of risk-sharing, boosting the EIB’s and the EBRD’s 
creditworthiness while reducing their fund-raising 
cost on international capital markets. For instance, 
pursuant to the External Lending Mandate of the 
EIB, the EU budget will provide guarantees against 
non-performing loans outside the EU (European 
Commission, 2016).    
In addition to leaning on the political authority and 
financial clout of “senior” institutions, the EIB and 
the EBRD have adopted the triangular mechanism 
for strategic purposes to ensure that their 
operations bolster the interests of, and the values 
espoused by, the EU. The majority of the EIB’s 
external activity is conditioned by the region-
specific mandates mapped out by the Council of 
the European Union and the European Parliament. 
Although the EU cannot control the EBRD directly, 
the EBRD enjoys close links to Brussels and has 
shown strong desires to deliver on EU priorities 
(Robinson & Bain, 2011).  A case in point is that the 
EBRD announced cessation of new investment 
activity in Russia shortly after Brussels imposed 
sanctions on Moscow, amidst escalating crisis in 
Ukraine in July 2014.  
The tri-partite framework has served European 
banks well; and there are good reasons for ADB 
and the AIIB to institutionalise a similar mechanism 
as well. The necessity of forging an Asian 
equivalent of European development troika could 
be better understood if one takes the volatile 
political dynamics in the Asia Pacific into account. 
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Table 1 Comparisons of properties of EIB, EBRD, ADB and AIIB 
 EIB EBRD ADB AIIB 
Year established 1958 1991 1966 2016 
Headquarters Luxembourg London Manila Beijing 
Head Werner Hoyer Suma Chakrabarti Takehiko Nakao Jin Liqun 
Membership 28 EU member states 
67 (including the EU 
and EIB) 
67 
57 (founding 
members) 
Capital subscription 
$275 billion 
(€243 billion) 
$39 billion 
(€30 billion) 
$153 billion $100 billion 
Paid-in capital ratio 9% 21% 5% 20% 
Financing sources 
Mainly international 
capital market 
borrowing through 
bond issuance 
Subscribed capital, 
market borrowing and 
net income 
Market borrowing, 
special funds and 
subscribed capital 
Subscribed capital and 
borrowing through 
securities issuance 
Standard & Poor’s 
credit rating 
AAA AAA AAA - 
Main instruments 
Loans, guarantees, 
micro-finance, equity 
investment and 
blended finance 
Loans, equity 
investments, 
guarantees, co-
financing and 
syndicated loans 
Loans, equity 
investments, 
guarantees, grants, 
and technical 
assistance 
Equity investments, 
guarantees, technical 
assistance and others 
Group institutions EIF - ADF, AIF and OCR - 
Top five 
shareholders 
Germany, France, Italy, 
the UK and Spain 
US, France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan and UK 
Japan, US, China, India 
and Australia 
China, India, Russia, 
Germany and Korea 
Developing country 
voting share 
- 
Transition economy: 
13.8% 
Regional: 65.1% 
Developing countries: 
46.8% 
Regional: 75% 
Key decisions Double majority 80% majority 75% majority 75% majority 
Board of directors Non-resident Resident Resident Non-resident 
Mandate and 
mission statement 
Contribute to the 
balanced and steady 
development of the 
internal market in the 
interest of the 
European Union. 
To promote transition 
to open, market-based 
economies in our 
countries of operation. 
To help our developing 
member countries 
reduce poverty and 
improve quality of life. 
Foster sustainable 
economic 
development, create 
wealth and improve 
infrastructure 
connectivity in Asia by 
investing in 
infrastructure and 
other productive 
sectors. 
Safeguards and 
procurement 
policies 
Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of 
the European Union 
Environmental and 
Social Principles and 
Standards. 
Ten different 
performance 
requirements ranging 
from biodiversity 
conservation to 
cultural heritage. 
Environmental, 
involuntary 
resettlement and 
indigenous peoples 
safeguards. 
Environmental and 
social assessment and 
management, 
involuntary 
resettlement and 
indigenous peoples. 
EIF=European Investment Fund, ADF=Asian Development Fund, AIF=ASEAN Infrastructure Fund, 
OCR=ordinary capital resources 
Source: Author’s compilation of website information, Kawai (2015) and Faure, Prizzon, and Rogerson (2015) 
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It is no overstatement to assert that the 
relationship between the EIB and the EBRD is 
naturally amicable, whereas that between ADB 
and the AIIB is contentious from the outset. The 
EIB is wholly owned by the EU; the Commission, 
the EIB and the EU member states collectively own 
62.8% of the EBRD’s capital. All presidents of the 
EIB and the EBRD have been EU citizens. In 
contrast, there is no cross-shareholding between 
ADB and the AIIB, and the largest shareholders of 
ADB – the US and Japan – are the notable 
absentees from the AIIB’s roster. In addition, each 
of US and Japanese voting shares at ADB is more 
than twice that of China, despite that China is the 
largest economy in the region and the American 
contributions to ADB are passive and diminishing 
(Okano-Heijmans, 2015). Hence the immense 
political needs to diffuse tensions between ADB 
and the AIIB – which encapsulate the underlying 
Sino-American rivalry – call for constructive 
participation of neutral third-party international 
organisation, to play the role of the EC, for 
smoother donors’ coordination. ADB and the AIIB 
should explore the possibility of entering into 
formal tri-partite MoUs with the World Bank, 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) or the United 
Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia 
and the Pacific (UNESCAP) to coordinate their 
investment in countries and themes of common 
interest.     
Besides global institutions, another set of 
candidates that have the potential to form one 
pole of the triangular partnership are regional 
institutions such as the Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations (ASEAN), the South Asian 
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).  
Their participation in donor coordination will on 
the one hand anchor aid recipients firmly in the 
driver’s seat, making sure that the loans and grants 
dispersed by ADB and the AIIB are demand-driven 
instead of supply-driven. They add value by 
adapting MDBs’ “one-size-fits-all”, prescriptive 
development approach to local realities as well. On 
the other hand, regional entities, which are 
charged to uphold the interest of the region as a 
whole, tend to have stronger incentives to 
minimise the negative cross-border or regional 
externalities of MDB’s essentially country-focused 
development interventions. At its best, regional 
authorities could also help to check against the 
inherent political risk of development banks’ 
investment and interventions, which cannot be 
adequately hedged by legal contracts, insurance or 
other financial instruments (Henisz & Zelner, 2010).  
Tri-partite partnerships are already taking shape, 
especially in South Asia. A consortium of the AIIB, 
the IFC and ADB was conceived to finance 
Pakistan’s Diamer-Bhasha Dam (News 
International, 2015). SAARC, through the SAARC 
Development Fund (SDF), is also keen to form a 
Consortium of Financial Institutions for the 
Strategic Growth of South Asia with ADB and the 
AIIB (SDF, 2016; Zee News, 2015).   
4. Sectoral complementarities 
There are a number of economic sectors in which 
both the EIB and the EBRD invest. Their sectoral 
division of labour is guided by the 
compartmentalisation of “areas of separate 
activity” and “areas of differentiated emphasis”. In 
the first instances, the two banks are encouraged 
to monopolise certain sectors and thematic groups, 
while giving up other less core or competitive ones, 
on a path towards greater specialisation and 
strengthened organisational identity.  
After years of interactions, conscious planning and 
institutional soul-searching, the EIB and the EBRD 
have developed complementary portfolios that 
reflect their core competencies and development 
priorities (Fig. 1). In 2010-2014, the EIB allocated 
more resources, in terms of the share in the overall 
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portfolio, to credit lines, health and education, 
energy and natural resources and transport sector 
through on-lending, equity, guarantees and risk-
sharing. The EBRD, on the other hand, ranked 
agribusiness including fishery and forestry, 
industry and information and communication 
technologies, services such as property and 
tourism, and municipal infrastructure relatively 
higher on their agenda. In general, the EIB assumes 
greater responsibility in larger-scale projects as an 
institution that specialises in volume lending; the 
EBRD, in contrast, has a strong focus on smaller 
scale sub-sovereign investment, municipal 
infrastructure and trade facilitation often in 
secondary cities (European Commission, 2016; 
Robinson & Bain, 2011). During 2010-2014, the 
average loan size of the EIB was €66 million per 
operation, while the figure for the EBRD was just 
€19 million (European Commission, 2016).  
 
Fig. 1 Comparison of EIB and EBRD investment portfolio by sector, 2010-2014 
Source: EIB project database, EBRD annual reports and author’s calculations
When it comes to the areas of common interest, 
the emphasis is placed on differentiated 
intervention approaches and cooperation at the 
intersection of their operational strategies. In the 
financial sphere for example, the EBRD provides 
support to SMEs directly, while the EIB focuses on 
providing support to the real economy through 
financial intermediaries. In post-project evaluation, 
the EIB’s key performance indicators prioritise 
quantifiable economic impact such as the number 
of jobs created by its interventions, whereas the 
EBRD continuously monitors the so-called second-
order development effects such as skill-upgrading, 
gender equality, corporate governance and private 
fund mobilisation. As such, developing countries 
where the EIB’s and the EBRD’s operations overlap 
and complement benefit from both the quantity 
and the quality of economic growth.    
ADB and the AIIB should follow suit and formulate 
differentiated yet complementary portfolios in line 
with their distinct mandates. ADB’s goal is to work 
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for an “Asia and Pacific free of poverty”. The AIIB, 
which does not have the word “development” in 
its name, states in its Statute that its raison d'être 
is to promote infrastructure development. Hence 
ADB and the AIIB could consider functional niching 
along the following three lines.  
First, ADB should continue to take care of the 
social needs of developing Asia as the AIIB has no 
intention to do so (Kawai, 2015). ADB’s 
internationally renowned expertise in social sector 
financing is one of the bank’s most important 
strategic assets. It is telling that when ADB and the 
EBRD cooperated in Central Asia republics, their 
MoU specified that “ADB will cover social sector 
needs” while “the EBRD will take the overall lead in 
private sector activities”. To tackle the 
demographic cliff that beleaguers many Asian 
economies in middle income traps, ADB is slated to 
double its assistance in education and health. ADB 
pledged to increase operations in the education 
sector to 6–10 % of its annual approvals from 3 % 
during 2008–2012, and commitments in the health 
sector to 3–5 % from a low of 2 % (Nikkei, 2015).     
Second, given the AIIB’s exclusive focus on physical 
infrastructure, ADB could bring about 
complementarities by leveraging its in-depth 
expertise on non-physical infrastructure 
investment, making sure that the policy 
environment in aid-receiving countries supports 
the optimal functioning of the hard infrastructure 
structures. In this regard, strengthening borrowing 
countries’ national capacity, through policy 
dialogues and other up-stream investment, is of 
particular relevance. ADB currently deploys around 
10 % of its loans to promote good governance by 
assisting developing country governments in policy 
areas like fiscal management, state-owned 
enterprises reform, fighting corruption and e-
governance (Fig. 2). In addition, ADB could 
facilitate the formation of a development-oriented, 
self-sufficient finance ecosystem to mobilise 
domestic savings in borrowing countries as 
market-maker, and sow the seeds of local 
epistemic communities to take on country specific 
development challenges as a knowledge broker. In 
a nutshell, ADB’s interventions should be done 
with the understanding that government is no 
substitute for market and public financing ought 
not to crowd out private investment and 
entrepreneurship. Aside from these elements, ADB 
has an indispensable role to play in building shock 
resistance infrastructure, disaster mitigation and 
social protection systems – which all fall out of the 
AIIB’s business purview – for at-risk communities 
in the Asia Pacific. For example, ADB was held at 
high esteem by regional countries after it 
responded quickly to the Nepal earthquake and 
the Vanuatu cyclone in 2015.  
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Fig. 2 ADB investment portfolio by sector 
Source: ADB (2015)  
Note: Percentages may not add up due to rounding. 
Lastly, the two banks can specialise in projects of 
different scale, just as their European counterparts 
have done. Early signs suggest that the AIIB would 
only target “big ticket infrastructure projects”, 
such as toll roads, hydro power plants, deep 
seaports and airports while having little appetite 
for irrigation systems, arterial roads or rural roads 
(Otto, 2015). Thus ADB, as the region’s “family 
doctor” (Okano-Heijmans, 2015), could fill the gap 
via operations of smaller scale and provision of 
support to “bottom of the pyramid” projects 
(Prada, 2014) in tandem with micro-finance 
organisations. It should be highlighted that the 
AIIB’s pre-occupation with sophisticated 
infrastructure undertakings can become a 
potential strength of the bank as the lack of 
knowledge about financing and constructing 
complex infrastructure is a more pressing issue 
than just funding shortage (Xu & Carey, 2015).  As 
the AIIB gets up and running and learns by doing, 
its accumulated expertise and hands-on 
experiences is likely to help borrowers better 
determine which projects to fund, where to build 
major infrastructure and address potential risks 
and problems upfront. The AIIB could be further 
incentivised to disseminate its knowledge on 
platforms such as the International Infrastructure 
Support System – an initiative piloted by ADB – to 
help shape international best practices. The 
willingness of the AIIB to share real-world solutions 
on a peer-to-peer basis will underscore AIIB’s (and, 
for that matter, China’s) reputation as a 
responsible stakeholder in the international 
development community.    
5. Geographical division of labour 
The EIB is not just a regional bank for Europe; it 
also supports investment projects in some 160 
countries throughout the world stretching from 
South Africa to Mexico. In 2015, the EIB penned 
financing contracts for 85 projects outside the 
Union, with total approved financing of €7.7 billion. 
Although the pre-accession region still stood out as 
the most significant recipient in terms of lending 
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volume, the largest number of new projects was 
found in the Africa, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) 
countries, and Asia and Latin America (ALA) 
regions. In contrast to the EIB’s global, omni-
directional coverage, the EBRD has a discernible 
regional orientation and it has operations in only 
37 economies so far.  
 
Fig. 3 Comparison of geographical composition of EIB’s and EBRD’s cumulative investment, 1991-2014 
Source: Author’s calculations based on the EIB project database and EBRD’s annual reports.  
Note: The grouping of countries is based on United Nations geoscheme. 
Figure 3 shows a comparison of geographical 
breakdown of the cumulative investment 
committed by the EIB and the EBRD between 1991 
and 2014. A geographical division of labour is 
evident. The EBRD is completely absent from 
investing in American and Oceania countries 
whereas the EIB has major portfolios in such 
countries as Brazil, Argentina, Ecuador and Papua 
New Guinea. Dictated by its founding mandate, the 
EBRD allotted a greater share of its financial 
resources to Europe, notably Eastern Europe, 
Caucasus and Russia. But as the boundary of the 
EU moves eastwards and some peripheral 
European countries, such as the Czech Republic, 
graduate from transition assistance, Central Asia 
emerges as the main destination of the EBRD’s aid 
flows. Total EBRD investment in the region in 2015 
increased 75%, reaching a historic peak of €1.4 
billion (EBRD, 2016). Kazakhstan is the largest aid 
recipient, receiving some €6.6 billion over the last 
two decades. In contrast, the EIB’s Asian operations 
concentrate in a handful of neighbouring Middle 
East countries like Turkey, Syria and Lebanon.2  In 
the Asia Pacific, around half of the EIB’s lending 
operations are co-financed with ADB.  
As for Asia, ADB’s activities are mainly taking place 
in East Asia and South Asia (Fig. 4). Although China 
and India started to borrow from ADB only after 
1986, they quickly become the two largest 
borrowers. Trailing behind is Indonesia, which on 
average received $740 million loans annually from 
ADB during 2010-2014 (ADB, 2016a). Figure 4 
underlines the observation: ADB’s geographical 
focus embodies Japan’s North-South maritime 
understanding of the Asia Pacific as an archipelagic 
power (Cook, 2015).  
                                                     
2
 The EIB also has relatively large investment in India, China and Sri 
Lanka, while the EBRD does not. 
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Fig. 4 ADB investment portfolio by borrower 
Source: ADB (2015) 
Note: Percentages may not add up due to rounding. 
By the same token, China is likely to project its 
East-West continental mentality to the AIIB’s 
operations.   Conceivably the AIIB’s Eurasian and 
African members along the New Silk Road 
Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk 
Road (collectively known as the “B&R Initiative”) 
will feature prominently on its agenda. Since the 
inception of the AIIB, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang 
had instructed the Beijing-based bank to align 
development strategies it devises for potential 
clients with the priorities of the grand scheme of 
B&R. A sensible strategy for the AIIB to begin with 
therefore would be to concentrate its firepower on 
bankable infrastructure projects in some 40 
countries along the B&R routes that either are non-
member of or do not borrow from ADB, such as 
Iran, Turkey and Saudi Arabia (Fig. 5). Investing in 
those countries would also boost China’s energy 
security, promote regional stability and spur 
economic development in its land-locked western 
provinces (Ekman, 2015). ADB on its part should 
commit itself more to the development needs of its 
members who are not eligible to borrow from the 
AIIB. A welcome step taken is that ADB is 
establishing extended missions in the Pacific region 
(ADB, 2016b) as none of these small and micro 
island states – which make up 13 of the 48 regional 
members of ADB – is founding member of the AIIB. 
In the longer term, however, it is paramount that 
ADB and the AIIB should cooperate with a view to 
integrate the “Chinese made” and “Japanese 
made” infrastructural networks to connect the 
whole of Asia Pacific. 
Furthermore, there seems to be scope for the AIIB 
to strengthen pan- and inter-regional connectivity, 
in light of ADB’s on-going efforts in facilitating 
intra- and sub-regional integration. Due to 
financing constraints and the perceived uneven 
distribution of benefits, cross-border 
infrastructures are usually not provided for by 
national governments (ADB, 2006). In the past 
decades, ADB has been a key advocate, monitor 
and administrator of a plethora of cross-border 
infrastructure and institution-building initiatives in 
several sub-regions of Asia. It serves as the 
Secretariat for Greater Mekong Sub-region, Central 
Asia Regional Economic Cooperation and South 
Asia Sub-regional Economic Cooperation and as 
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development partner/technical advisor for Bay of 
Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and 
Economic Cooperation, Indonesia-Malaysia-
Thailand Growth Triangle and Brunei Darussalam-
Indonesia-Malaysia-The Philippines East ASEAN 
Growth Area. Adding to these, ADB has since 2011 
run a dedicated ASEAN Infrastructure Fund, with 
total equity contributions of $485.3 million, to 
enhance intra-ASEAN connectivity and facilitate 
the launch of the ASEAN Economic Community.  
 
Fig. 5 Membership of development banks and B&R initiative 
Source: Author’s own figure  
Not unlike their cross-national-border counterparts, 
cross-regional-border and pan-continental 
infrastructural networks tend to be under-
developed, not least because they necessitate 
inter-governmental coordination and cooperation 
on a massive scale. However, with inter-regional 
trade on the rise and globalisation steadily 
marching forward, there is an urgent need to 
upgrade and build internationally integrated, inter-
continental, intermodal transport and logistics 
networks (ESCAP, 2013). It is therefore natural for 
the AIIB to take a leading and catalytic role in 
financing the six economic corridors that form part 
of the inter-continental B&R’s land route: New 
Eurasian Land Bridge, China-Mongolia-Russia 
Corridor, China-Central Asia-West Asia Corridor, 
China-Indochina Peninsula Corridor, China-Pakistan 
Corridor and Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar 
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Corridor (CBBC, 2015). Thanks to Russia’s status as 
the AIIB’s third largest shareholder, the AIIB is in a 
better position than ADB to finance the 
modernisation of the Trans-Siberian Railway and 
the construction of inter-continental proposals 
such as the Trans-Eurasian Belt.  
Against this backdrop, Europe located at the other 
end of the Silk Road should take concrete steps to 
seize the opportunities offered by the AIIB and the 
B&R initiative (Arduino, 2016). There is a growing 
awareness in Europe that the new terrestrial and 
maritime links between Asia and Europe, planned 
constructed and paid for in part by the AIIB, are 
conducive to Europe’s search for new markets and 
partners. More profoundly, the AIIB’s vision of an 
ever closer Eurasia allows Europe to re-examine its 
relationship with Asia and decide – should Europe 
perpetuate its long-standing “generous but 
disengaged” attitudes towards the rapidly growing 
Asia (Okano-Heijmans & Waardenburg, 2014), or 
ride on the wave of Asia’s economic prosperity and 
political ascendance? European policymakers need 
to recognise that a strategically aligned and 
commercially inter-connected Eurasia has the 
potential to transform itself from the famous 
“missing link” in the triadic international economic 
structure to the core of the global financial and 
geo-economic map that is being redrawn.  
6. Project co-financing 
The main modality for operationalising cooperation 
at the project level between the EIB and the EBRD 
is co-financing. The EC-EBRD-EIB Tripartite MoU 
articulates that, to identify co-investment 
opportunities at the earliest possible stage, the EIB 
and the EBRD are obliged to exchange information 
on their pipelines of potential operations every two 
months. When implementing co-investment, the 
EBRD – staffed mainly by economists and financial 
experts – relies on the strong engineering and 
technical capacity of the EIB during joint appraisal 
missions; and the latter often authorises the 
former to follow up with municipalities on project 
proposals and monitor the progress of co-financed 
projects due to a shortage of local representatives 
(European Commission, 2016). Mutual recognition 
of procedures and standards and development of 
shared diagnostic tools are also consciously 
pursued to streamline administrative procedures, 
speed up loan disbursement, reduce transaction 
costs and avoid duplications for clients.          
Over the period 1996-2015, the EIB and the EBRD 
co-financed more than 80 projects on a project-by-
project basis or under joint facilities (Table 2). The 
EIB and the EBRD tend to co-fund large projects 
where the costs and risks are high, and operations 
where the two institutions’ policy objectives 
converge (European Commission, 2016). Their first 
co-financing was to help Romania rehabilitate 224 
km of national roads and commercialise national 
road administration in 1996. Country coverage has 
since then been expanded to more than 20 
countries in Eurasia and North Africa. The war-torn 
Serbia, involved in 24 joint aid programmes, was 
the biggest recipient of co-financing from the EIB 
and the EBRD. Other notable beneficiaries include 
Albania, Moldova, Ukraine (7 projects each), 
Armenia, Bulgaria and Bosnia and Herzegovina (5 
projects each). Close to half of the co-financed 
projects were found in the transport sector, and 
the rest of fund went to municipal infrastructure; 
leasing finance, financial intermediary deposits and 
other credit lines; energy and natural resources; 
information and communication technology; and 
manufacturing and service industry. The scope of 
co-investment is now broadened to reach projects 
that have climate change and environmental 
impacts.  
In addition to co-funding, the EIB and the EBRD 
provide technical assistance to beneficiary 
countries together. An example is the Joint 
Assistance to Support Projects in European Regions 
programme, under which the EIB and the EBRD 
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offer free specialist advice to European countries to 
help them prepare high quality projects to be 
financed by EU structural funds. Each of the banks 
brings their own perspectives to the table, thus 
consolidating the common pools of intellectual 
resources. The cross-fertilisations of ideas and 
knowledge transfers that take place during joint 
provisions of technical assistance also spur policy 
innovations and promote mutual learning between 
the EIB and the EBRD.     
Co-financing was identified by ADB and the AIIB as 
a step-stone towards an in-depth and all-round 
donor partnership in Asia. The AIIB’s financing 
target of 2016 is $1.2 billion, of which joint projects 
with ADB and the World Bank will account for a 
substantial share. The AIIB has started searching 
for co-funding opportunities with ADB in such 
sectors as transport, renewable energy, urban 
infrastructure and water supply. The first ADB-AIIB 
co-financed project will be the $273 million worth 
motorway project – the 64-km-long Shorkot-
Khanewal section of the M4 motor way in Pakistan 
– that runs close to the China-Pakistan Economic 
Corridor (Reuters, 2016). Identification of potential 
co-financing opportunities in Central Asia and 
South Asia with the World Bank is also underway. 
The attractiveness of co-financing in Asia can be 
ascribed to a host of intertwining factors. At the 
strategic level, co-investment could engender a 
political rapprochement between China and the 
countries that still have reservations against 
Beijing’s leadership and the AIIB’s standards. It is 
widely known that the US Congress would veto any 
attempt that tries to channel US taxpayers’ money 
to a Beijing-led bank, but US could still participate 
indirectly in the AIIB’s corporate governance and 
investment activities through projects that the AIIB 
co-finances with ADB or the World Bank. After 
gaining first-hand insights into how this new bank 
will operate and what kind of project it will lend to, 
the US and other outliers could eventually embrace 
the AIIB and become full members.  
At the policy level, co-financing helps align the 
safeguard policies, financial discipline and 
operational practices of the AIIB with international 
standards across the project cycle. Since 2009, 
ADB’s Safeguard and Accountability Mechanism 
has provided that all co-financing partners have to 
honour its rules concerning safeguard, 
transparency, bankability and procurement (Roul, 
2015). Similarly, the Co-Financing Framework 
Agreement between the World Bank and the AIIB 
requires the global institution to prepare and 
supervise the co-financed projects in keeping with 
its stringent policies and procedures. In a sense, co-
financing is an instrument for existing MDBs to 
socialise the nascent AIIB. At the transaction level, 
co-financing accelerates initial phases of the AIIB’s 
projects and reduces administrative costs in case 
the AIIB is induced to use existing, off-the-shelf 
financial products, which both existing donors and 
borrowers are familiar with.    
Meanwhile, ADB counts on the AIIB to realise it 
ambitious co-financing target. ADB in its 2006 
Financing Partnership Strategy made a promise 
that the growth of co-financing commitments 
would outpace that of ADB’s own financing (ADB, 
2016b). The proportion of co-financing in ADB 
loans and grants approved annually more than 
tripled from 11% in 2007 to an average of 37% 
between 2012 and 2015. Even so, ADB still failed to 
live up to the expectation that the share of co-
financing should reach 70% by 2016 (ADB, 2016b). 
Adverse developments that limit ADB’s co-
financing capacity with other aid agencies in the 
future include banking culture differences (in the 
case of co-financing with the EBRD), non-existence 
or expiry of formal cooperation framework (e.g., 
the EIB), foreign aid budget cuts (e.g., the 
Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and 
Trade), shifting country priorities away from Asia 
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(e.g., the British Department for International 
Development) and others (ADB, 2016b). In this 
context, teaming up with the AIIB seems to be a 
natural choice to make. Nevertheless, it is 
important to note that joint financing should not 
be treated as an objective per se. Instead, a 
strategic understanding between ADB and the AIIB 
on how co-financing projects could serve as the 
nucleus for other areas of donor coordination and 
cooperation to maximise and aggregate the 
effectiveness and efficiency of their respective 
financing is of greater significance. 
7. Concluding remarks  
With the AIIB maturing into a full-fledged 
multilateral bank, developing Asia will soon have 
two engines to propel its socio-economic take-off. 
But ADB and the AIIB cannot afford to walk on 
their own paths because running a multilateral 
organisation is no cheap business (Gehring & 
Faude, 2010). Memberships of ADB and the AIIB 
overlap considerably. The 41 countries that are 
party to both banks cannot logically have 
incentives to maintain, on a long term basis, two 
regional development banks if they perform 
essentially identical tasks and serve the same 
group of countries. Had the EBRD not re-invented 
itself, acquired new resources or shifted its 
geographical scope eastwards in the face of the 
EIB’s heightened spending in the European 
neighbourhood, it would have been shut down as a 
redundant actor (Jin, 2015). Viewed in this light, 
promoting ADB-AIIB complementarities is not only 
desirable for avoiding short-term operational 
conflicts but essential for their long-term 
institutional survival. 
That said, a line cannot be drawn arbitrarily 
between the ADB and the AIIB to divide the 
responsibilities. This paper, drawing in part on the 
collaborative experiences of the EIB and the EBRD, 
proposes four ways to enhance coordination and 
cooperation between ADB and the AIIB in order to 
reinforce the aid effectiveness and efficiency of 
each other. Specifically, it argues that ADB and the 
AIIB should form tri-partite coordination 
mechanism to promote mutual accountability and 
facilitate high-level policy dialogue, develop 
complementary portfolios in terms of sectoral 
exposure and geographical coverage, and co-fund 
projects to set the ball of cooperation rolling. More 
importantly, the resulting synergies will stitch the 
two development banks into an interdependent 
and coherent donor structure in Asia and beyond.    
The key for the ADB and the AIIB to materialise the 
performance-enhancing potential of their 
complementarities is mutual accommodation. ADB 
may deliberately shrink or withdraw development 
interventions in certain issue areas and countries 
where it has comparative disadvantages vis-à-vis 
the AIIB and invite the latter to take over. The AIIB, 
for its part, should enter the development business 
in a way that takes ADB’s practices, preferences 
and existing client base into consideration. 
Admittedly, iterations of reciprocal adaption will 
necessarily come with a price tag (e.g., erosion of 
institutional sovereignty and identity), but 
enhanced donor coordination and refined 
comparative advantage will benefit Asia as a whole. 
In this regard, AIIB must understand that the 50-
year-old ADB is certainly going to suffer from some 
structural inertia that prevents it from optimally 
and swiftly adapting to the new reality. The self-
claimed “lean, clean and green” AIIB without 
historical baggage should, therefore, take the 
initiative to reach out to ADB, demonstrate 
willingness to make necessary adjustment, and 
prove that its pledge to “complement and 
cooperate with the existing MDBs” is not just 
rhetorical.  
Last but not least, a caveat is worth highlighting. 
This paper is not a call for dismissing the value of 
healthy inter-institutional competitions, as long as 
they do not escalate into open confrontation. 
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Table 2 List of selected EIB-EBRD co-financing projects 
Country Project title Project description 
Co-financing amount 
Signed in Status 
EIB EBRD Others 
Romania 
NAR Restructuring and Road 
Rehabilitation Project 
Restructuring of the National Administration of Roads (NAR) 
and rehabilitation of 224 km of national roads in Romania. 
ECU 70 million 
ECU 78.1 
million 
ECU 136.4 million from IBRD 
ECU 197.4 million from Romania 
ECU 27 million from Phare 
1996 Completed 
Estonia 
Tallinn Airport Passenger 
Terminal Reconstruction 
Rehabilitation and improvement of the passenger terminal at 
Tallinn Airport and provision of additional space for 
commercial activities. 
ECU 10 million 
ECU 7.6 
million 
- 1997 Completed 
Bulgaria 
Bulgarian Transmission 
Network 
Rehabilitation of electricity transmission and distribution lines 
on the national network. 
€41.1 million 
€60 
million 
- 
EBRD in 1999, 
EIB in 2002 
Completed 
Macedonia 
Macedonia Regional Roads 
Project 
Construction of Skopje bypass and upgrading of north-south 
highway. 
€60 million 
€40 
million 
- 
EIB in 1999, 
EBRD in 2000 
Signed 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Railways Recovery Project 
Rehabilitation of country’s main railway network, along the 
north-south (Pan European Corridor V). 
€31 million 
€21 
million 
Grants: €2 million from Japan, €1.7 
million from Canada and €0.7 million from 
USTDA 
2001 Signed 
Russia 
St. Petersburg Flood 
Protection Barrier 
Construction of flood barrier in St. Petersburg region. €40 million 
€204 
million 
€1.7 billion from Russia, €33.3 million 
from NIB and €4.3 million form others 
EBRD in 2002, 
EIB in 2005 
Completed 
Montenegro 
Montenegro Airports: 
Urgent Rehabilitation Plan 
Urgent rehabilitation and modernisation of Podgorica and 
Tivat airports. 
€11.5 million 
€11 
million 
€6.5 million from Airports of Montenegro 
EBRD in 2003, 
EIB in 2004 
Signed 
Albania 
Vlore Thermal Power 
Generation Project 
Construction of combined-cycle thermal power plant in Vlore. €40 million 
€40 
million 
€20.3 million from World Bank (IDA) and 
€10.2 million from Albanian Power 
Corporation 
2004 Signed 
Serbia 
Belgrade Highway and 
Bypass Project 
Rehabilitation of the Gazela Bridge and approach roads and 
construction of the remaining sections of the Belgrade 
bypass.  
€60 million in 2007 
and €40 million in 
2010 
€80 
million 
€112 million from Serbian Roads and €7.5 
million from Belgrade  
EBRD in 2006, 
EIB in 2007 
and 2010 
Signed 
Moldova 
Moldova Road 
Rehabilitation Project 
Rehabilitation of trunk road network along main east-west 
and north-south routes. 
€30 million 
€30 
million 
$16 million from World Bank 2007 Signed 
Bosnia and 
Herzegovina 
Corridor Vc 
Construction of new priority motorway sections of the 
Corridor Vc. 
€75 million 
€180 
million 
- 2008 Signed 
Tajikistan 
Sugd - Energy Loss 
Reduction project 
To reduce distribution network losses, improve quality of 
supply and increase energy efficiency. 
€7 million €7 million €7 million from IFCA 2011 Signed 
Russia 
Vladivostok Combined Heat 
& Power Plant 
Construction of a combined heat and power plant on an 
industrial brownland site in Vladivostok. 
€91 million 
€100 
million 
- 
EBRD in 2012, 
EIB in 2013 
Signed 
Tunisia 
Bizerte Lake Environmental 
Project 
To finance an environmental clean-up project in Lake Bizerte. €40 million 
€20 
million 
€15 million from NIF 2013 Signed 
Armenia Yerevan Solid Waste Project 
To support the construction of environmental infrastructure 
in Yerevan. 
€8 million €8 million €8 million from NIF 2015 Signed 
IDA=International Development Association, IFCA= Investment Fund for Central Asia (EU), NIB=Nordic Investment Bank, NIF=Neighbourhood Investment Facility (EU), USTDA=United States Trade and 
Development Agency. 
Source: Project databases of EIB and EBRD project description summary documents.  
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Benign competitions in a controlled manner could 
prevent the formation of a “cartel of good 
intentions” (Easterly, 2002), forcing ADB to lower 
cost and the AIIB to raise quality in a “race to the 
top”. A balance between collaboration and 
competition will have to be struck by ADB and the 
AIIB in their search for appropriate places in the 
global development finance community.  
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